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*1481 ORDERED LIBERTY: RESPONSE TO MICHAEL DORF
We appreciate Michael Dorf's serious engagement with our book and his conclusion that “it responds effectively to the charge

that liberalism focuses on rights to the exclusion of responsibilities.” 1 He charges us, however, with an “errant theodicy” - with
making the “claim that we have . . . the freedoms we have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons
requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.” 2 He also criticizes us for deriving basic liberties from a “freestanding
interest in autonomy.” 3 In this response we aim to clarify our argument concerning responsibility as autonomy and to reject
the interpretation of our book as deriving basic liberties from any such freestanding principle of autonomy.

In Ordered Liberty we develop a civic liberalism that answers four charges against liberal theories of rights: (1) irresponsibility
(the argument famously made by Mary Ann Glendon, that such rights license irresponsible conduct and preclude governmental
pursuit of responsibility in the exercise of rights); (2) neutrality (that such theories require neutrality among competing
conceptions of the good life, undermining civil society as “seedbeds of virtue” and precluding government from promoting good
lives); (3) wrongness (that liberals justify rights of autonomy on the ground of “empty” toleration of wrong conduct instead of
respect for the personal capacity for responsibility or recognition of the substantive moral goods or virtues fostered by protecting
such rights); and (4) absoluteness (that liberals take rights too absolutely, to the *1482 subordination of responsibilities, virtues,
and the common good, and in doing so debilitate the political processes and impoverish judgment). 4

As we understand Dorf, he focuses on our book's response to the irresponsibility critique. There, in chapters two and three,
we show the degree to which our civic liberalism permits government to encourage responsibility in the exercise of rights but
not compel what it holds is the responsible decision. We do not argue for a general right to responsibility as autonomy. We
fear that we may have given the contrary impression through our stylized contrast between (1) responsibility as accountability
to community and (2) responsibility as autonomy or self-government and our use of Glendon and Ronald Dworkin as foils

representing these two understandings. 5 Our response to the irresponsibility critique, however, is not a political theory project
of deriving rights from a freestanding principle of autonomy. It is a constitutional theory project of showing the ways in
which recognizing constitutional rights like procreative autonomy leaves room for government to moralize by, for example,
encouraging pregnant women to deliberate responsibly and conscientiously before having an abortion.
Our primary treatment of the grounds for justifying rights comes later in the book, in response to the wrongness critique and the
absoluteness critique. There we undertake the constitutional theory project of justifying constitutional rights already recognized
in our constitutional cases on grounds of both individual autonomy and the moral goods fostered by protecting them. We do

this, for example, with respect to the right of procreative autonomy and the right to same-sex marriage. 6 We grant that our
justification of basic liberties is not merely backward-looking, concerned only with justifying the constitutional rights already
recognized. We contemplate that the constitutional practice of securing ordered liberty should go on as before, reasoning by

analogy from cases already decided to the new cases that arise, developing lines of doctrine in a principled and coherent way. 7
Even here, though, we propose elaboration of basic liberties through common law constitutional interpretation and reasoning
by analogy rather than through working from and elaborating a freestanding principle of autonomy. Indeed, in chapter nine,
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in our debunking of the “myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights” under the Due Process Clause and our analysis of

the actual practice of reasoned judgment concerning ordered liberty in the line of cases from Meyer v. Nebraska 8 through
*1483 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 9 and Lawrence v. Texas, 10 we implicitly reject any idea
of a freestanding principle of autonomy.

We largely accept Dorf's list of the various “sorts of reasons [that] justify the recognition of a right or the conclusion that

some proffered justification for infringing a recognized right falls short.” 11 He suggests that autonomy doesn't add much, if

anything, to the reasons on the list. 12 We agree that a freestanding principle of autonomy does not operate in constitutional
cases as a basis for deriving rights. But we believe that common-sense understandings of autonomy do manifest themselves in
constitutional cases, even through the very types of justifications on his list. Dorf writes: “For example, one can read Griswold
v. Connecticut to rest on the proposition that there is a right of married couples to use contraception simply because any
effort to enforce the prohibition would intrude on constitutionally protected privacy.” 13 He then quotes Griswold: “‘Would
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very

idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”’ 14 In justifying Griswold's recognition of
a right of privacy, we interpret these very passages as reflecting concern to protect freedom of intimate association within the

marriage relationship in order to promote the “noble purposes” of the institution. 15 This interpretation illustrates what we call
“deliberative autonomy.” 16 Deliberative autonomy here is a structure that houses and articulates arguments made for basic
liberties in constitutional cases in a way that shows their coherence and defensibility. The types of reasons for protecting rights
of autonomy are down to earth, ecumenical, and familiar, not abstract, freestanding, or “theodicean.” 17

In clarifying our argument, it may be helpful to contrast two types of political and constitutional theory. The first purports to
derive all of our basic liberties or constitutional rights from one basic principle, such as autonomy, dignity, liberty, or equal

concern and respect. 18 The second, by contrast, begins with a list of basic liberties typically recognized in constitutional
democracies such as our own (or already recognized in a constitutional practice like ours) *1484 and aims to show how those

basic liberties fit together and are best justified. 19 Dorf seems to interpret our theory as the former sort, but it is decidedly the
latter. We begin with the basic liberties already recognized in certain constitutional cases and show how they fit together and are
best justified as preconditions for what we call deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy. In Securing Constitutional
Democracy: The Case of Autonomy, one of us (Fleming) called this project a “constitutional constructivism” (by analogy to
John Rawls's “political constructivism” as developed in his Political Liberalism). 20 The justifications for the basic liberties,
moreover, appeal to the mutual support of a number of considerations that fit or hang together, not simply to one freestanding

principle from which they all derive. 21 Dorf may recognize this obliquely, since his “main point” is that “affirming our belief
in people's capacity to act responsibly does not count for much as a justification for individual rights, but it is a necessary feature
of such rights as we do recognize.” 22

Finally, we grant that some philosophical accounts of free will may amount to what Dorf calls a liberal “theodicy.” Dorf might

criticize Dworkin's discussion of free will in Justice for Hedgehogs 23 along these lines, and even more so Dworkin's recent

Einstein Lectures on “religion without god.” 24 We do not believe that our account of securing ordered liberty makes any
“theodicean” claim “that we have any of the freedoms we have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment
of persons requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.” 25 Our conception of ordered liberty is constructivist, not
theodicean.

Footnotes
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Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law.
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Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.
We thank Michael C. Dorf for writing his thoughtful Review Essay, for presenting it at the Boston University School
of Law Symposium on our book on February 11, 2013, and for posting a modified version of his Review Essay on the
Balkinization blog's Symposium on our book, which took place from February 19 to 22, 2013. Symposium on Fleming
and McClain, Ordered Liberty, Balkinization (Mar. 19, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/03/symposium-onfleming-and-mcclain.html. Our response is based on our remarks at the Boston University Symposium and our post on
the Balkinization blog in response to Dorf. We thank Jack Balkin for facilitating the Balkinization Symposium.
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